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A few years ago, during the heyday of the urban crisis,
the role of the state in urban affairs was a hot subject for
debate. After years of being ignored, state government,
the invisible partner in the federal system, suddenly
became the candidate for a new and more meaningful
role. One result of this new-found interest — plus the
availability of federal funds — was the creation around
the country of state departments of local or urban affairs.
In Illinois, legislation brought into life the Department
of Local Government Affairs. The story of the department
begins in 1968 when the initial studies were made. In
this paper we will examine the creation and the first
three years of the department. During this period the
legislation for the agency was drawn up and passed;
the department set up operations and designed several
significant programs. We will focus on the strategies
behind the creation of the department and the thrust of
its early programs. At the end of the paper we will
summarize some of the major issues associated with the
development of such agencies in state government.
Development of the Department
The Department of Local Government Affairs (DLGA) was
created in the early part of 1969. ' During the previous
summer the Municipal Corporations Committee of the
Republican-controlled state Senate had begun research
on a local affairs agency. That fall the Republican candidate
for governor, Richard B. Ogilvie, took a public position
in favor of
"establishing a Department of Local Government
Affairs to assist municipal governments in planning and
technical advancement." After his election in November,
Ogilvie urged that the background research on creating
such an agency continue. In order to understand the
present functions of this agency, it is necessary to outline
the early decisions which helped to shape initial depart-
mental policies. The following description is based upon
personal involvement at the formative stages and upon
interviews conducted during the summers of 1969 and
1973.
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THE TASK FORCE PHASE
The first step within the Ogilvie administration was the
assembling of an informal gubernatorial task force to
develop the form and functions of a state agency which
would assist local units. The task force consisted chiefly
of Ron Michaelson, the governor's aide for local affairs;
George Warnecke, the staff counsel for -the Committee
on Municipal Corporations; and this writer, who was then
at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the
University of Illinois. Temporary members included
Donald Tolva of the State Senate staff and William Hanley
of the governor's legal staff, both of whom were involved
on particular issues.
By the end of 1968 the outline of the proposed code
department emerged (see Fig. 1). As envisaged by the
task force the agency would serve two basic functions.
It would provide a coordinated and comprehensive state
level response to local problems, and it would assist
local units in solving their own problems, theoretically
enhancing the prospects for local self-determination.
The task force proposed transferring several existing
state units with local responsibilities to the new department.
These included the State Housing Board, the Property
Tax Appeals Board, the Office of the Fire Marshall,
the local responsibilities of the Auditor's Office, some
limited planning functions of the Department of Business
and Economic Development, and the Division of Local
Government and Property Tax from the Revenue Depart-
ment.
The department proposed by the task force contained
three important features:
1 The director of the agency was permitted to provide
assistance directly to nonofficial local bodies (the
bypass clause)
Figure 1
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2. "Little state capitols" would be set up in various
parts of the state to provide citizen access to the state
governmental process.
3 Through consolidation, a single state agency was
given comprehensive operational authority in the areas
of housing, community services, local finance, poverty,
and planning.
Clearly, the agency departed from the traditional and
noncontroversial form of ad hoc, fragmented state assis-
tance to official local units, as experienced in Illinois.
STRATEGIES OF CHANGE
As the task force prepared the measure for introduction
in the General Assembly it decided to follow several
unwritten legislative rules. First, although the governor's
staff wanted passage in the 1969 session, no rigid time-
table for implementation was prepared or followed. This
is not an unusual procedure in Illinois, where chaotic
legislative calendars and periodic executive involvement
in legislation preclude adherence to tightly ordered
schedules. Second, in line with tradition, the task force
cleared major provisions with Senator Arrington, one of
the important leaders in the General Assembly. For
example, as the bill took shape, the matter of transferring
the Property Tax Appeal Board, a matter close to
Arrington, was reviewed with his staff. Third, there was
an attempt to couch potentially threatening terms in
technical language. In Illinois it is common practice to
render bills noncontroversial by "thesaurusizing" them.
In drafting this bill, for example, a temporary member
of the task force insisted that the phrase "eliminate
poverty" was too strong. With some reluctance, the task
force accepted the innocuous phrase, "reduce economic
disparities." Fourth, in accordance with formal legislative
procedure, it was decided to introduce the measure as a
committee-prepared bill but to identify it as an adminis-
tration priority.
The task force honored some aspects of legislative
protocol but rejected others. There was an early decision
not to consult the major interest groups affected by the
legislation. Interest groups in Illinois customarily have
a great deal to say about legislation. In some cases,
consultation in the drafting stage is a matter of courtesy;
in others, it is a matter of practical politics. In this case,
the major interest groups were the Illinois Municipal
League and the city of Chicago. The decision not to involve
them in the drafting stage was made in full recognition
of their influence in Springfield.
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A second major decision was to draft the bill as a
highly detailed and specific measure. Normally, legislation
of this kind is drafted in general terms so as to maximize
administrative flexibility and minimize specific opposition.
In this case, however, the bill detailed the powers of the
department, outlined the innovative concepts, listed the
functions of the divisions, and made specific reference
to community organizations, direct contracting, and local
centers.
A third innovative approach involved an attempt to
coordinate executive and legislative resources in drafting
and implementing the bill. Such coordination had been
impossible in the recent past because of the split in
political parties between the executive and legislative
branches.
By January 1969 the basic provisions of the bill were
outlined. After several detailed "cleanup" sessions to
refine the language and straighten out technicalities,
the bill was prepared for introduction in March.
THE LEGISLATIVE PHASE
Although the proposed new department and its functions
were quite unexceptional, the bill creating DLGA generated
a good deal of resistance from a number of sources at
each stage of the legislative process. Most of the ob-
jections were raised during the first hearing on the
bill in the Senate Municipal Corporations Committee.
Some were technical and concerned transfers of agencies
and imprecise language, but many were substantive.
The center of controversy was the authority of the director
to "bypass local officials and to deal directly with
accredited community organizations." This concern
over bypassing local officials was summarized in a
lengthy memo from the Illinois Municipal League. The
director of the league suggested that the department
be purely advisory and that all references to community
organizations be deleted. He persuaded three of the ten
Republican committeemen to withhold support for the bill
until amendments were made. The three Republicans
were joined by the five committee Democrats, who labeled
the bill "the biggest power grab" they had ever seen.
By a vote of 8 - 7, the committee chairman was forced to
postpone consideration until a compromise could be
effected.
Two sides formed over the issues. The Municipal League,
on one side, wanted the department to be purely advisory
and to have no functioning authority. On the other side,
the governor's task force and the committee sponsors
insisted that the state had a responsibility to provide
direct services. Informal compromise sessions were of
no avail, and final agreement on the bill was reached
only a few hours before the committee held its second
hearing. Compromise language calling for the provision
of services upon request only was accepted, and all
references to community organizations were dropped.
These were the major substantive changes. The bill
was resubmitted and passed out of committee by a party
vote of 10-5.
Upon advancement to second reading, the bill was
further revised. The language transferring the Office
of the Fire Marshall and the local duties of the Auditor's
Office was amended out. Although the functions of these
offices are minimal and their power relatively insignificant,
the agencies were strong enough to prevent an attempted
reorganization.
At the time of third reading, there was little doubt that
COMMUNITY SERVICES
The Office of Community Services, created to serve as a
"one-stop service center to local governments," became
the star of the department during the first three years.
More than any other subdivision, its policies and programs
illustrated the approach of DLGA to local affairs.
With a professional staff of ten to fifteen, Community
Services provided four kinds of assistance to local units.
The division established an information service for local
units on federal and state programs. The staff played an
advocate role in coordinating the resources of related
state agencies such as the departments of agriculture and
conservation. It maintained a three- to five-man field staff
to provide advice and assistance to local officials. Finally,
Community Services assisted local units in matters of
budgeting and finance, functions intended in the task
force draft for the Office of Local Finance.
There were a number of major programs in the Office
of Community Services. Leadership training seminars
were held periodically throughout the state to upgrade
local officials and provide information on.current adminis-
trative issues, such as home rule and revenue sharing.
A city-county talent bank fashioned after the federal
intergovernmental personnel exchange was set up but
never got off the ground. Crisis-oriented community
development grants were distributed; in one year they
totaled $80,000 Task force studies and reports were
prepared on such topics as small town development and
revenue sharing. Indeed the role of DLGA in rural develop-
ment and the work of the Office of Community Services
with the governor's special cabinet on small town problems
were viewed as major accomplishments of the new agency.
The field staff devoted a great deal of time to casework.
An urban intern program was established; students from
all over the state spent the summer working for various
urban governments. The Cook County Council of Govern-
ments' intern project was subsidized for a year. Support
was given to the Urban Area Study Commission. The
office provided information and assistance to local
governments on finance and budgeting. A clearinghouse
was set up to keep track of federal programs.
Programs like the urban intern experience were extremely
popular. Other activities, such as the clearinghouse, were
so casual as to be of limited value. At any rate, the programs
of this division seemed to be characterized by the
following policies:
1. To engage in activities which are technical, like
information sharing, or noncontroversial, like debris
removal.
2. To provide assistance only upon request, as opposed
to taking an aggressive planning role.
3. To work with official agencies and involve only
official representatives, as in the leadership training
programs and in the hiring of former elected officials
as field staff.
4. To spend limited funds in small amounts in several
localities, as opposed to concentrating resources on an
in-depth project in one area.
5. To focus on downstate, rural communities, rather
than large, urban centers.
To some degree these policies and priority areas were
developed by the DLGA leadership and staff. In another
sense, of course, these activities were a result of legislative
direction and were done in strict accord with legislative
mandate.
HOUSING AND BUILDINGS
Formerly a separate unit in state government, this agency
was intended by the Ogilvie administration to play a
secondary role to the Illinois Housing and Development
Agency (IHDA). To some extent, knowledge of its intended
role prevented Housing and Buildings from developing
into the innovative unit which had been Director Lehn-
hausen's original intention. Yet, because it was loosely
coordinated by the governor's staff, the office developed
its own programs and policies independent of DLGA
direction.
Generally speaking, the office stayed within the tradi-
tional programmatic boundaries of the state agency
responsible for public housing administration — issuing
certificates, approving appointments, and the like. It
provided comprehensive technical assistance to the 126
local housing authorities in Illinois, administered its
federal HUD training programs, and supervised grant
applications for housing-related programs.
In addition, the office initiated new programs in quality,
low-income housing development, began occupancy
audits of local authorities on a fee basis, and studied
low-income housing needs through the Social Service
Delivery Systems Project. Another program, related to
the HUD Breakthrough Program, involved the construction
of modular units on a pilot basis in selected Illinois areas.
The policies which seemed to guide the implementation
of these projects were:
1 Administrative agreement between IHDA and the
Office of Housing and Buildings (OHB) to assume different
roles, with OHB assuming a low profile but nonetheless
taking advantage of its statutory flexibility and developing
new programs.
2. Emphasis on negotiations and the involvement of
local authorities in training programs and pilot projects,
rather than on regulation of local authorities.
3. Concentration of limited staff and money in selected
program areas (federal grants and federal pilot projects),
rather than the provision of broad technical assistance
to local authorities.
4. Concern with the noncontroversial physical and
administrative aspects of public housing to the neglect
of the explosive issues of economic inequality and racial
tension.
RESEARCH AND PLANNING
The Office of Research and Planning (ORP) was transferred
almost intact from the Department of Business and Eco-
nomic Development (BED). Although the original act
was vague as to the planning functions of the new depart-
ment (statewide and local planning were mentioned in
the initial bill), ORP's major activity in DLGA continued
to be administration of the federal Comprehensive Planning
Assistance Program (the popular 701 grant). In addition,
localities were provided with limited technical and advisory
planning services (the TAPS program), and the issue of
regionalization was studied in depth. Finally ORP was
viewed internally as a means of evaluating DLGA's
operations. Despite the confusion of the legislation, at
no time were ORP's functions redundant with other state
planning operations or with the later-created Office of
Planning and Analysis.
Research and Planning did not meet its anticipated
responsibilities in three key areas. First, the staff did
not conduct formal and regular internal evaluations of
To carry out these objectives and provide a coordinated
response to local affairs, the DLGA was organized into
four operating divisions (see Fig. 2). The divisions func-
tioned until January of 1973, when a new governor
appointed a new director of the agency. In the following
section of the paper the policies and programs of the
department as a whole and of the four divisions are
evaluated for the period of January 1969 to January 1973.
The analysis is based on DLGA records and on a series
of interviews with most past or current officers, division
heads, and principal staff available durinq the summer
of 1973.
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
There seems to be little concurrence between the five
objectives of the bill creating the department and the
actual operations of the agency.
1. Despite the goal of dealing more effectively with
the urban crisis and the conditions of urban areas, most
interviewees pointed out that the department dealt
mainly with small, rural, downstate communities; evolved
a hands-off policy with regard to Chicago; and, until 1972,
largely ignored even suburban Chicago municipalities.
It is true, however, that DLGA did attempt to get involved
indirectly in suburban activities through the Cook County
Council of Governments. Moreover, in fairness to the
department, representatives of the city of Chicago rebuffed
initial attempts at cooperation by Director Lehnhausen
with the comment, "How much money do you have for us?"
At a time when urban problems are often equated with
racial problems, DLGA did not have a single black
officer on its staff during its first three-year period. More
importantly, DLGA had virtually no minority- or race-related
programs in operation. The initial legislation had encouraged
the agency to be responsive to the particular needs of
urban minorities, but the department took no special
measures to develop such policies.
2. The record is mixed with regard to the department's
efforts to promote an integrated response to metropolitan-
wide problems and provide incentives for coordinated
planning and consolidation. The effort spent on the
metropolitan transit study, the idea of the city-county
talent bank, the continuation in DLGA of the Department
of Business and Economic Development's legacy of
metropolitan planning, and the subsidation of areawide
planning agencies indicated some state action in this
area.
On the other hand, the actual dollars and staff time
allocated to support areawide planning were negligible.
Interstate urban areas were largely avoided; almost no
work was done with metropolitan-wide special districts.
A $15,000 intern program subsidy was given to the Cook
County Council of Governments, which Governor Ogilvie
founded, but even this grant was discontinued after one
year. In short, little was accomplished during these initial
years in the critical areas of metropolitan land use,
interagency planning, or financial incentives for consoli-
dation. DLGA did cooperate with study groups, such as
the Commission on Urban Area Government, but this type
of involvement never went beyond the study stage.
3. The third goal was to make the department a central
source of information on state and federal programs.
Interviews indicated partial achievement of the original
legislative intent. The department staff did keep track of
federal programs affecting local areas, and provided
basic information on federal grants on an informal basis.
At the same time, it was admittedly difficult for a depart-
ment with a limited budget and staff (five field staff
in the Office of Community Services) to follow through on
helping a community participate in federal programs.
In addition, the department has little influence over the
setting of federal or state priorities and must compete
for resources under a set of rules which informally earmarks
funds to certain constituencies or certain areas. For ex-
ample, half of the Law Enforcement Assistance money
goes automatically to Cook County, and one-twelfth of
the state income tax is automatically rebated to existing
local units. Much of the process of distribution of state
and federal monies is inflexible, not discretionary, and
DLGA can do little to adjust this process.
4. The fourth objective was to make state agencies
more visible and responsive to local governments. Although
the goal is obviously vague and its achievement difficult
to measure in any specific way, interviewees made two
points. Some argued that through casework by the Office
of Community Services field staff, local units were given
moral and technical support. The department attempted
to be a friend in Springfield to small government throughout
the state. This policy was reinforced by the official policy
of serving governments only at their request, as the
legislation specified.
Others contended that the basic policy of the department
was to deal with those local problems that were dramatic
and highly visible, but noncontroversial. Three examples
illustrate the point: 1) the $20,000 grant to Crescent City
to clean up after a train wreck in the spring of 1970;
2) the $20,000 grant to Thompsonville to assist after a
1971 tornado; and 3) the coordinated planning offered
by the department to the city of East St. Louis after a
1972 railroad explosion. Although the assistance was
undoubtedly well intentioned and useful, it reflects the
crisis approach of dealing with dramatic and visible
emergencies rather than with complex, long-term problems.
5. Finally, the interviewees were asked about the goal
of decentralizing state authorities and enhancing local
determination and home rule. Several comments were
directed to this issue. One respondent pointed out that
the director and the staff of the department personally
believed in the principle of local control. Consequently,
grants and assistance were extended with no strings
attached and only at the request of local officials. As
another example, the highly publicized training programs
for local officials were designed to improve local leader-
ship. Although there was no question that the department
honored the home rule principle, it is less clear that this
hands-off attitude regarding local officials is the same
as citizen local determination. The department never
attempted to bypass elected officials or municipal govern-
ment and deal directly with formal community organi-
zations and other citizens' groups.
Given the mixed responses in these various areas, it
is perhaps safest to agree with one respondent that "the
department's policy was a lack of policy"; there simply
were no clearly defined, departmentwide plans and
priorities in dealing with local affairs. Rather, the policies
and programs reflected the background and outlook of
the first director, a former downstate mayor; the constraints
of a legislative body used to dealing with technical
problems; and the lack of gubernatorial allocations of
money and staff to implement massive change.
If there was no clearly formulated, consistently applied
departmental policy, there was a good deal of action
at the division level. Division programs and policies
illustrate the diversity of the department's roles.
the heavily amended bill would pass the Republican-
dominated Senate. The Democrats made a show of
opposition, reiterating that the bill "was nothing but a
power grab" and would force the city of Chicago to come
"hat in hand to Springfield," especially when federal
grants were involved. Nevertheless, when the final roU
was called, the Democrats "took a walk" and the bill
passed the Senate 37-4. As the Democratic leader
admitted, "[This] was the kind of bill we would like to see
pass." Apparently, the proposal had been watered down
enough to make it acceptable to "Municipal League
Republicans" and "city Democrats" alike. But it was
not yet out of trouble.
Following passage in the Senate the bill was routed
to the House Executive Committee where, on first reading,
it was almost defeated by a vote of 13-13. The objections
at this point were articulated by a Chicago-area Republican
who feared that the department would interfere with
federal grants and would "become another NIPC"
(Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission). These
objections were somewhat irrelevant as the bill never
specifically authorized state or regional interference in
local control, and federal grants were protected by "non-
interference" provisions. Nonetheless, changes were
made reflecting these concerns, and the bill was given
a "do pass" recommendation.
Although there was no opposition during second
reading in the House, at third reading these objections
surfaced again. Suburban and some downstate Democrats
quietly favored the bill, but Chicago Democrats charged
that the bill signaled the end of local authority. Even some
Chicago-area Republicans compared the department to
an octopus which would grab everything in sight, especially
federal grants. The controversy over community organi-
zations was resurrected by references in the debate to
community action activities. In the end, after vigorous
horsetrading by the Republican sponsor James Peterson,
the bill was passed, 95 - 57.
The bill signed by the governor bore only a skeletal
resemblance to the original task force draft. In the original
bill the director had the authority to work with community
groups; now his powers were substantially reduced. I he
proposed office of economic opportunity was removed.
All references to community organizations were deleted.
The department was limited to providing services only
at the request of local officials. The number of local
officials on the advisory council was increased, thus
reducing participation by at-large members. Little state
capitals were not provided for, and only four of the recom-
mended six agencies were to be consolidated into the
department.
Performance of the Department
The legislative statements which accompanied the creation
of the agency outlined five broad goals:
1. To reorganize agencies at the state level to deal
more effectively with the urban crisis.
2. To provide statewide financial and technical assis-
tance and incentives for areawide organizations and to
reduce fragmentation of government.
3. To establish a central source of information on state,
and especially federal, programs.
4. To make state agencies more visible at the local
level and more responsive to local units.
5. To strengthen local governments by providing state
services upon request.
Figure 2
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DLGA's operations. Second, ORP did little to provide
financial or programmatic incentives for local, and espe-
cially metropolitan, planning operations. Nor did it
assist local planning by ranking and evaluating local,
including community, needs and proposing strategies for
the state to meet these needs.
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
The legislation creating DLGA transferred the Division
of Local Government and Property Tax from the Department
of Revenue to the new department. The functions of this
division had been to assist local units in such technical
matters as budgets, real and personal property tax
assessment, and tax district boundaries. Most of these
functions were continued in its new location.
In terms of staff and budget, the Office of Financial
Affairs (OFA) became the largest division in the new
department. Although the legislation referred to assigning
new functions, the division continued the program of
intercity equalizations, the state assessment of property
tax, and the assistance provided to local units. The most
visible and popular features of the OFA were soon
transferred to the Office of Community Services. Since
then, Community Services, through its local budget and
financial affairs section, has coordinated the federal
revenue sharing plan with local units and administered the
state income tax rebate.
In the one area in which OFA attempted to innovate —
using new criteria in computing the state equalization
factor, which is used to determine tax assessments —
the agency received critical press coverage for playing
politics with the multiplier. In addition, it was noted that
OFA failed to assist in assessing complicated properties
such as sophisticated industries and intercounty areas
and that during the first three years it failed to seriously
study the property tax, even though OFA was the one
state agency with authority in this area.
Conclusions
By any reasonable measure, the performance of DLGA
during its first three years must be rated as mixed.
Despite its lack of overall policy and its case-by-case
approach to problems, the department accomplished
several modest goals. It was a "friend in court" to cities
and villages, it channeled some federal and state planning
and emergency money to local units, and it provided
limited technical advice. The question, as one observer
put it, is whether these jobs are worth doing — whether
there should be a state-supported version of the Illinois
Municipal League. More than this, the question is, Can
such a department be anything more than an upgraded
Illinois Municipal League, given the vagaries of politics
and the strength of the league in the Illinois legislature?
It is difficult to evaluate the performance of DLGA because
it is a new agency with a limited budget and staff, and
the statutory expectations were unrealistically great. To
accomplish the many objectives outlined in the statutes,
DLGA would have had to have been a massive bureaucracy
with an unlimited field staff and operating budget The
major criticism of the department is that it could have
done so much more even with its limited resources. It
might have worked informally but directly with community
organizations. It might have concentrated technical
resources on metropolitan and regional planning efforts.
It might have recognized and publicized the responsibility
of state government for urban problems through study
commissions and through conferences and training
sessions.
To put these criticisms in perspective it should be
emphasized that the Illinois experience is not unusual.
Around 'the country departments of community affairs
and departments of local government have been criticized
for not doing enough to help the cities. 2 These criticisms,
while not severe, are the natural result of unmet expec-
tations. In many states, the heady rhetoric of the urban
crisis was not matched by delivery of resources or pro-
grams. In this context it is perhaps a disservice to "fault"
agency administrators on lack of action when in fact they
had little staff, money, or legislative authority to accomplish
multiple goals imposed on them. If the staff of DLGA during
the first three years is criticized for being overcautious
and reluctant to get involved, this is at least partly
understandable.
Regardless of the specific criticisms of its performance,
the Department of Local Government Affairs did achieve
its single most important purpose. Merely by its existence
the department acknowledged that there is a role for
the state in local affairs. This is the department's significant
contribution.
2 Lawrence O
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